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Implicit in many discussions of labour market policy is the assumption that, in the absence of 
interventions, the operation of the labour market is well-approximated by the perfectly competitive 
model.  The merits or demerits of particular policies is then seen as a trade-off between efficiency and 
equality.  This paper analyses the impact of a variety of policies – the minimum wage, trade unions, 
unemployment insurance, progressive income taxation and restrictions on labour contracts – on 
efficiency when labour markets in the absence of intervention are monopsonistic and not perfectly 
competitive.  A simple version of the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model is used for this purpose. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
Debates about the desirability and consequences of labour market interventions continue to be at the 
heart of many policy debates about the way in which modern industrialised economies should be run.  
The most prevalent opinion among economists is that, in the absence of interventions, the operation of 
labour markets is well approximated by the perfectly competitive model.  This view, when combined 
with the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, results in a presumption of efficiency in the free 
market unless proved otherwise and an innate suspicion of interventionist policies.  To be sure, there are 
many individual papers that identify reasons why the free market may not be efficient but these papers 
tend to be issue-specific and there is no single unifying model to rival that of the perfectly competitive 
model which continues to have a powerful hold over the minds of economists.  As a result, debate about 
the merits of intervention is often put in terms of a trade-off between efficiency and equality with those 
economists favouring a more interventionist approach tending to be those who have a welfare function 
that puts greater weight on equality and/or those who believe the efficiency cost of equality is relatively 
low. 
Empirical research helps to provide evidence on the impact of interventions that informs 
economists’ views about the relevant trade-offs, but empirical research finds it hard to say much about 
efficiency issues and the presumption that interventions reduce efficiency dominates (explicitly or 
implicitly) much thinking.  In Samuelsons dictum “in economics, it takes a theory to kill a theory; facts 
can only dent a theorists hide” and that view motivates this paper. 
It tries (perhaps over-ambitiously) to provide a rival to the perfectly competitive model as a tool 
to analyse the efficiency of labour market interventions.  It sets up a simple, theoretical, imperfectly 
competitive model of the labour market (based on the wage-posting model of Burdett and Mortensen, 
1998) and uses that model to address a whole range of labour market interventions, namely: 
· minimum wages 
· policies to encourage trade unions 
· unemployment insurance to support those whose labour market earnings are low or non-existent 
· progressive tax systems 
· policies like restrictions on hours or health and safety legislation to limit the form of contracts that 
can be signed between employers and workers. 
The theoretical model assumes that ‘free’ labour markets are better thought of as monopsonistic 
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rather than perfectly competitive.  As many (if not most) labour economists are sceptical about the 
relevance of monopsony, some justification for this assumption is needed.  Manning (2001) provides a 
lengthy and detailed argument but the basic argument can be summarised very briefly: the perfectly 
competitive model makes the unbelievable assumption that a wage cut of a cent immediately causes all 
workers to leave the firm.  However, there are good reasons to believe that labour markets have 
substantial frictions as it is costly for workers to change jobs and employers to find workers.  These 
frictions mean there are generally rents in the employment relationship and that cutting the wage will not 
lead to an immediate quit giving employers some monopsony power. 
The paper shows that, in monopsonistic labour markets, one can prove surprisingly strong 
results about the beneficial efficiency effects at the margin of most (though not all) of the labour market 
interventions listed above.  This should not be taken to imply that these policies are always good, just 
that they are not always bad.  The presumption of economists should be that these policies are desirable 
and the debate about the appropriate level of intervention. 
The plan of the paper is follows.  The next section outlines the basic model of a monopsonistic 
labour market that we will use in the theoretical part of the paper.  It is a simplified version of a model 
by Burdett and Mortensen (1998).  We then use this model to analyse the impact of a number of typical 
social democratic interventions: the minimum wage, trade unions, welfare benefits, progressive income 
taxation and restrictions on the legal form of labour contracts.  We show that ones view of these policies 
is always more positive if one starts from a monopsonistic perspective though this should not be taken to 
mean that these policies are always good, just that one should not have the instinctive reaction that they 
are automatically bad.  
 
 
1. Monopsony in the Labour Market 
 
If there are rents from frictions, one needs to have some view of the way in which they are divided.  The 
wage-posting model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) assumes that employers set wages and the 
model of this paper is based on theirs.1 
                                                                 
1  Perhaps the most common alternative model used is ex post bargaining between worker and employer (e.g. 
Pissarides, 1990 or Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, for a comparison).  In many situations, the bargaining and 
wage-posting models have the same predictions but there are cases (see below) where there are important 
differences.  For low-wage labour markets, wage-posting seems a more appropriate assumption: e.g. Machin and 
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We will start with the case where the number of workers and employers are fixed and in which 
the wage offer distribution is exogenously fixed.  The basic assumptions are: 
(A1) Workers: There are Mw workers all of whom are equally productive and attach equal 
value, b, to leisure.  They seek the job with the highest wage.  
(A2) Employers : There are Mf employers, each of which is assumed to be infinitesimally small 
in relation to the market as a whole.  All employers have constant returns to scale, the productivity of 
each worker being p.  For future use, denote the ratio of firms to workers by M=Mf/Mw. 
(A3) Matching Technology: Both employed and unemployed workers receive job offers at a 
rate ?(M) where ?’(M)>0 and 1Mle < .  Job offers are drawn at random from the set of firms.  
Employed workers leave their jobs for unemployment at an exogenous job destruction rate du.  All 
workers, both employed and unemployed, leave the labour market at a rate dr, to be replaced by an 
equal number of workers who initially enter unemployment.  Define d=du+dr.  
(A4) Wages: For reasons that are explained in more detail in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), 
(and will be briefly discussed later) the equilibrium will have a wage distribution.  Denote the cumulative 
density function of wages across employers by F(w) and the associated density function by f(w).  For 
future use, denote the inverse of F(w) by w(F).  For the moment, treat this as exogenous though the 
bulk of the paper will be about how different interventions affect the wage offer distribution.  In some of 
what follows, taxes will drive a wedge between the wage paid by employers and that received by 
workers: so denote by wc(F) the consumer wage received by workers in an employer at position F in 
the wage distribution. 
These assumptions have been chosen to be the simplest possible whilst retaining the essential 
features of a monopsonistic labour market in which a higher wage reduces the separation rate and raises 
the recruitment rate.  The following Proposition provides some useful preliminary results. 
 
Proposition 1 
In the labour market with fixed numbers of workers and employers: 
1. Employment in the firm at position F in the wage distribution is given by:   
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(M)
N(F)  =  
M[  + (M)(1-F) ]
dl
d l
 (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Manning (1997) found that one-third of UK residential care homes chose to pay all their care assistants exactly 
the same hourly wage, an outcome that would be hard to explain in terms of ex post bargaining. 
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 2. The employment rate, n, in the economy is given by: 
 
(M)
n  =  
+ (M)
l
d l
 (2) 
3. The expected level of profits, ( )E p , is given by: 
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 where E(w) is the expected wage paid by employers. 
4. The value of being unemployed, Vu, is given by: 
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d l
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 (4) 
where E(wc) is the expected wage received by workers. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple.  (1) says that employment in a firm is determined by 
the overall ratio of firms to workers (M) and by the position in the wage distribution (as high-wage firms 
have lower separation rates and find it easier to recruit).  The overall employment rate as given by (2) is 
simply determined by inflow and outflow rates.  (3) and (4) say that both expected profits and value of 
being in the labour market are determined by expected wages.  The expression for workers in (4) has a 
simple intuition.  The employment rate is given by (2) so the final term in (4) is the probability of being in 
employment multiplied by the expected surplus when in employment. 
Now consider the case (not analysed by Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) where the supply of 
both workers and employers to the labour market is not completely inelastic.  For firms, we will assume 
that there is a cost of entry Cf which, to give some flexibility in the model about the elasticity in the 
supply of firms, will be assumed to vary across potential employers.  Denote by Cf(Mf) the value of Cf 
for the marginal employer if there are Mf employers.  Then, in the free entry equilibrium, and using (3), 
we must have: 
 
( )[ ( )]
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d l
-
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+
 (5) 
On the worker side, we will use an analogous method of introducing some elasticity into the 
labour supply by assuming that there is a ‘participation’ cost of Cw that must be paid each period.  If the 
worker does not pay it then they cannot be employed or get a job offer.  This is a stylised way of 
introducing some elasticity into labour supply but one could imagine it as the (amortised) cost of 
acquiring skills necessary for employment before labour market entry.  We will assume that Cw varies 
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across workers: denote by Cw(Mw) the value of Cw for the marginal worker if there are Mw workers in 
the labour market.  The free entry condition for workers can be derived as follows. 
Let us distinguish between the value of being unemployed Vu and the value of non-participation 
Vn which, as non-participants are always unemployed and save the cost of participation, can be written 
as: 
 nr w  =  b + V Cd  (6) 
Free entry of workers means that, in equilibrium, we must have Vu=Vn for the marginal worker so that, 
using (4), the ‘free entry’ condition for workers can be written as: 
 
( )[ ( ) ]
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l
d l
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+
 (7) 
For fixed wages, the free entry equilibrium then involves solving (5), (4) and (8) for Mw and Mf. 
The simplest way to see that there is a unique equilibrium (for a given level of average wages) is to note 
that (7) implies a positive relationship between M and Mw as the greater the ratio of employers to 
workers the higher is the employment rate.  And, as long as the elasticity of ( )Ml  with respect to M is 
less than one, (5) implies a negative relationship between Mf and M as the greater the ratio of employers 
to workers the lower is employment per firm.  Using M=Mf/Mw we can eliminate Mf from (5) to have a 
negative relationship between Mw and M.  The supply of firms (5) is represented by FF in Figure 1 and 
the supply of workers in (7) by WW. 
The distribution of the entry costs for employers and firms determines the elasticity of the FF 
and WW lines.  For example, if all firms have the same entry costs then the supply of firms to the market 
is perfectly elastic and the FF lines are vertical.  If, on the other hand the supply of labour to the market 
is inelastic then WW will be horizontal.  But, it should be apparent that the set-up used here 
encompasses a wide range of possibilities: this helps to ensure that none of the conclusions will be 
sensitive to assumptions made about elasticity in the supply of firms or workers to the market. 
One might wonder about the efficiency of the equilibrium.  We will not worry about 
distributional issues and will just focus on the total surplus, S.  This can be written as: 
 
0 0w
MM(M)(p-b) fwS  =   M w fw w f f+ (M)
- (m )dm (m )dmC Cl
d l
-ò ò  (8) 
The first term is the surplus from employment and the other terms the costs of participation of employers 
and workers.  The following Proposition provides some first-order conditions for the efficient levels of 
Mf and Mw. 
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Proposition 2 
1. The first-order conditions for the efficient numbers of employers and workers can be written as: 
 fM f2
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M[ + (M)]
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where e?M is the elasticity of ?(M) with respect to M. 
2. If the expected producer and consumer wages are equal then both efficiency conditions will be 
satisfied if: 
 ( ) ( )ME w p p bl
d
e
d l
= - -
+
 (11) 
Proof: see Appendix. 
This shows that an appropriate level of average wages can satisfy the efficiency conditions for 
both the entry of firms and the entry of workers.  If the expected wage is higher (lower) than the efficient 
level there will be excessive entry of workers (firms) and insufficient entry of firms (workers). 
So far, the distribution of wages has been treated as exogenous.  But, let us now consider 
whether the free market attains these efficiency conditions or whether wages will be too high or too low. 
 
 
2. The Free Market Equilibrium 
 
In this section we assume that employers set wages to maximise profits.  This is the equilibrium 
considered by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) so we shall only discuss it briefly here.  They show that 
the only possible equilibrium is a wage distribution without mass points: the reason being that if there is a 
mass point in the wage distribution then an employer who deviates by paying a wage e higher will have 
only infinitesimally lower profits per worker but a much higher level of employment as they will now be 
more attractive to all the workers in the firms at the mass point. 
As all firms must, in equilibrium, make the same level of profits, the wage paid at position F in 
the wage offer distribution, w(F), must satisfy: 
 [ ( )] ( ) [ (0)] (0)p w F N F p w N- = -  (12) 
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where w(0) is the wage offered by the lowest-wage firm.  Taking expectations of (12) we have that: 
 [ ( )] ( ) [ (0)] (0)p E w E N p w N- = -  (13) 
Using (1) and (2), (13) can be solved to yield the following expression for the average wage in the free 
market equilibrium: 
 ( ) [ (0)]E w p p w
d
d l
= - -
+
 (14) 
so the average wage is a weighted average of marginal product and the lowest-wage offered. 
 Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show that the lowest wage offered in the free market equilibrium 
will be the reservation wage of unemployed workers.  The reason is simple: there is no point in offering a 
lower wage as no workers will accept the job and there is no point in offering a higher wage (if one is 
the lowest wage firm) as one can lower wage costs without affecting the supply of labour to the firm.  
And, with job offers arriving at the same rate whether employed or unemployed, the reservation wage is 
simply equal to b, the value of leisure.  Hence, in the free market we will have w(0)=b and (14) 
becomes:  
 ( ) [ ]E w p p b
d
d l
= - -
+
 (15) 
so that the average wage is a weighted average of marginal product and the reservation wage.  But, is 
the free market level of wages the efficient level: comparison of (14) and (11) readily leads to the 
following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
If 1Mle <  then average wages are too low in the free market equilibrium. 
Proof: Simple comparison of (14) and (11). 
For a given value of M, this Proposition implies that there are too many firms in the market, the 
reason being that excessive entry is encouraged by the monopsony profits on offer.  In contrast, there 
are, for a given level of M, too few workers in the market as they receive less than their marginal 
product. 
However, one should not conclude that there are too few workers in the market compared to 
the first-best.  Figure 2 makes it clear why.  The line F’F’ represents the entry conditions for firms when 
average wages are at their efficient level and FF when they are at the free market level.  Similarly, 
W’W’ represents the efficient entry condition for workers and WW the free market condition.  M, the 
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ratio of firms to workers, is clearly too high in the free market but Mw may be too high or too low.  For 
example, if e?M=0 then Mw is too low, but if e?M is close to one then Mw is too high. 
The rest of this paper is about whether we can restore efficiency through a suitable set of 
policies. 
 
 
3. The Minimum Wage and Trade Unions 
 
First, let us consider the introduction of a minimum wage of wm in this model.  As long as this is above b, 
this will be binding on the lowest wage firm in the market and will become the lowest wage paid.  The 
expected wage distribution will be given by (14) with w(0) replaced by wm .  As the minimum wage 
raises average wages and free market wages are too low, it is not surprising that an appropriately 
chosen minimum wage can restore efficiency: the following Proposition tells exactly the wage that is 
necessary. 
 
Proposition 4 
A minimum wage, wm, which satisfies: 
 m M
p - w   =  
p - b
le  (16) 
will lead to the socially optimal outcome. 
Proof: This is the value of wm that makes (14) the same as (11). 
The rule in (16) is similar to the result of Hosios (1990) for the efficient distribution of surplus in 
matching models with ex post bargaining rather than wage-posting.  The Hosios rule for efficiency is that 
the workers share of the surplus should be equal to e?M: (16) says that this should be the workers’ share 
of the surplus in the lowest-wage firm.  But, importantly, workers in all other firms in the wage-posting 
model get a higher level of the surplus and this does affect one’s interpretation.  The Hosios result is 
often interpreted to say that the workers share of the surplus may be too high or too low for efficiency 
and there is no a priori reason to believe one case or the other.  In contrast, this result says that, with 
wage-posting, there is an a priori case to believe that the workers’ share of the surplus is too low and 
should be raised even though the share of the total surplus may be very high.  Note, that this result does 
not say that minimum wages can be raised without limit without eventually reducing efficiency.  If 
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minimum wages are set at a level above that given by (16) then efficiency will be reduced.  But, in 
contrast to the competitive model, minimum wages can be expected to be desirable over some range. 
 One could do a similar sort of analysis with trade unions.  Modelling the impact of trade unions 
is time-consuming, as one has to specify union preferences and the nature of the bargaining between 
employers and unions.  But, it is simple enough to see that if unions raise the average level of wages (a 
reasonable condition) then a certain amount of unionisation or union power can help move the free 
market towards efficiency. 
 
 
4. Unemployment Benefits 
 
In this section we consider the impact of paying welfare benefits to the unemployed.  We start by 
assuming that all individuals not in employment (i.e. both the unemployed and the inactive) receive a 
payment r when not in work, which is financed by a lump-sum tax, t, on those in work.2 
The lowest wage firm must still make its workers indifferent between working (which pays 
[ (0) ]w t-  to workers and not working (who receive [b+r]): hence the lowest wage paid by employers 
must be w(0)=b+r+t.  Substituting this into (14), the expected producer wage for firms is given by: 
 ( ) [( ) ( )]E w p p b r
d
t
d l
= - - - +
+
 (17) 
It should readily be apparent that the unemployment insurance system will raise the average producer 
wage which can improve efficiency as it will move the FF line in Figure 2 towards the efficient F’F’. 
 However, it is not good for the incentives for workers to enter the labour market.  The average 
consumer wage E(wc) will be equal to ( ) ( )cE w E w t= -  and non-employed workers receive (b+r) so 
the free entry condition for workers will become: 
 
) ( )
]
ww
(M [E w (b+r)]
  =  ( )C M
[ + (M)
l t
d l
- -
 (18) 
which, using (17), can be written as: 
 
2
2
) ( )
]
ww
(M [ p (b+r)]
  =  ( )C M
[ + (M)
l t
d l
- -
 (19) 
                                                                 
2  One could also imagine a lump -sum tax on firms which can act, unsurprisingly to reduce the number of firms for 
which there is an efficiency argument. 
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Inspection of (19) shows that the effect of welfare benefits is to discourage entry of workers as well as 
firms.  This shift in labour supply cannot move us towards efficiency as it moves the WW line away from 
W’W’.  It is possible that welfare benefits can improve efficiency (if the benefit of the shift in the FF line 
outweighs the cost of the shift in the WW line), but they cannot in their current form be used to attain the 
social optimum. 
This analysis seems to support the conventional view that unemployment benefits discourage 
employment.  However, although welfare benefits are typically modelled in the way we have just done, 
most unemployment benefit systems do not give out benefits unconditionally to those who are not in 
work - they are also required to search for work.  As OECD (2000) puts it "scant attention in economic 
theory has traditionally been devoted to the labour market eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits". 
Where welfare benefits are contingent on job search, the welfare payments are not just a 
disincentive to work but also an incentive to search for work.  This latter effect might be expected to 
increase employment.3  In the current model, the simplest way to consider the impact of a job search 
requirement is to assume that those who are inactive do not receive the welfare payment r while those 
who are unemployed do.  Such a job search requirement drives a wedge between the utility flow when 
unemployed (which will be given by b+r) and the utility flow when inactive (which will be given by b).  
Hence, using (4) and (6) with these modifications, the entry condition for workers will become: 
 
) ( ( ) )
]
ww
(M [ E w (b+r)]
r +   =  ( )C M
[ + (M)
l t
d l
- -
 (20) 
where the first term in r is the effect of the subsidy to job search. 
The following Proposition shows that this simple change can be enough for us to attain the first-
best. 
 
Proposition 5 
If the unemployment benefit scheme breaks even then unemployment insurance at the level: 
 M
(M)[p-b](1- )
r  =  
[ + (M)]
ll e
d l
 (21) 
attains the social optimum. 
 
                                                                 
3  There is some evidence to this effect e.g. Abbring et al (1999) for the Netherlands.  Ashenfelter et al (1998) also 
report the results of four experiments designed to ensure that job search requirements were being met: the 
implication of their results is that, broadly speaking, they were. 
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Proof: See Appendix. 
The intuition for this result is that unemployment insurance plus a job search requirement can 
transfer resources from employers to workers (as is required for efficiency) without a leakage of 
resources to those individuals who do not enter the labour market which is the problem with 
unemployment insurance without the job search requirement. 
 
 
5. Progressive Income Taxation 
 
In recent years, tax credits (like the US Earned Income Tax Credit and the UK Working Families Tax 
Credit) have been widely used to provide incentives to work while ensuring a safety net level of income 
for low-wage workers.  While these programmes are not always as new as claimed (the UK’s WFTC 
is very similar to the earlier Family Credit) they are much more generous, largely funded out of the 
windfall gains in government tax revenue from strong economies.  This makes their economic analysis a 
bit more complicated.  On the one hand, they involve a reduction in the average tax rate on the affected 
workers as they are not break-even policies.  On the other hand, they typically involve an increase in 
marginal tax rates so are formally equivalent to an increase in the progressivity of taxation.4  
Let us consider the likely effect of this policy.  To keep things simple, assume that only labour 
income is taxed (and not income received when unemployed) and that post-tax income is given by (1-
t)w+t 0 if income is w.  We will assume that the income tax scheme must break even so that an increase 
in progressivity can be thought of as an increase in t0 together with an appropriate increase in t.  The 
assumption that income when unemployed is unaffected by the tax system ensures that we are simply 
analysing the impact of a redistribution of income among those in work. 
What is the impact of progressive income taxation on the equilibrium of the economy?  First, 
consider the lowest wage paid by employers.  Workers in the lowest-wage firm must continue to be 
indifferent between work and unemployment so that we must have: 
 0(1- )w(0) +   =  bt t  (22) 
The expected wage must then satisfy (14) with w(0) as determined in (22).  We can prove the following 
result about how the free entry and labour supply conditions are affected. 
                                                                 
4.  Of course, these policies have not been explicitly described as an increase in tax progressivity for to do so 
would be to expose one to the accusation of aggressive taxation policies.   
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Proposition 6 
A revenue-neutral increase in tax progressivity reduces the average wage paid by employers and 
received by workers: this moves the economy away from efficiency. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
This result might seem a bit surprising but is very simple.  The lowest-wage firm can cut wages 
when progressivity increases as its workers are, at the initial wage, better off than before.  This reduces 
the average wage paid by employers.  If the tax system is revenue-neutral then the average wage 
received by workers is the same as that paid by employers, so this reduction in the average wage makes 
workers worse-off.  Another way to think about this result is that subsidising low-wage labour 
encourages the payment of low wages and, in a monopsonistic labour market, employers have the 
market power to take advantage of this. 
The actual impact of policies like EITC and WFTC are likely to be rather different from this for 
a number of reasons.  First, they are not typically revenue-neutral: to the extent that there are ways in 
which the overall tax burden on labour has been reduced, they will tend to encourage labour supply and 
the entry of firms.  Secondly, they are not directed at all segments of the population (typically they only 
apply to families) so the general equilibrium effects on wages may not be as large as they seem here.  
And the potentially undesirable side-effect could be removed if combined with a minimum wage as 
employers would not then be able to cut wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution: in practice 
this is often what happens. 
 
 
6. Restrictions On Labour Contracts 
 
A common form of labour market intervention is a restriction on the form of labour contracts that can be 
agreed between worker and employer.  These vary from anti-slavery laws which prohibit adults from 
selling themselves into slavery, to health and safety legislation, to restrictions on the number of hours that 
may be worked.  Economists are often particularly hostile to these types of interventions because, in a 
perfectly competitive labour market, there will not only be an efficiency cost from the restriction on free 
contracting but because they may also fail to make better-off those they aim to help as one would 
expect an off-setting adjustment in wages which may even make workers worse-off than they would be 
in the absence of the intervention (see, for example, the discussion in Summers, 1989).  This section 
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shows that, in a monopsonistic labour market, such restrictions can be expected to make workers better 
off even if wages can be freely adjusted.  As we want to focus on the issue of whether these restrictions 
can make workers better-off we will restrict attention to the case where the numbers of workers and 
employers in the market is exogenously fixed.5 
Consider a very stylised form of these restrictions.  Suppose that workers and employers do not 
agree just a wage w, but also an effort level, e.  Ceteris paribus, a higher level of effort means more net 
revenue for the employer so let us denote this by p(e) where p’(e)>0 and lower utility for the worker.  
Let us denote their utility function by v(w,e) where ve(w,e)<0.  ‘e’ could be interpreted as hours or how 
dangerous the job is or any non-pecuniary aspect to the job which workers dislike but which raises the 
profits of the firm. 
The fact that higher paid workers tend to have jobs that are more pleasant in non-pecuniary 
aspects and that increasing prosperity has generally led to more pleasant and safer working conditions 
gives us strong reason to believe that e is a ‘normal bad’, that as workers get better-off they demand 
less of it.  This amounts to the condition that: 
 ww e we
w
v v  -   >  0v
v
 (23) 
and we will assume this in what follows. 
First consider what will happen in a perfectly competitive market.  Employers will face an 
exogenously given market level of utility that they need to pay to attract any workers: let us denote this 
by v0.  They will choose the wage and effort to solve the problem: 
 max 0  [p(e)-w]    s.t.    v(w,e)  v³  (24) 
leading to the first-order condition: 
 e
w
(w,e)vp (e)  =  - 
(w,e)v
¢  (25) 
which, together with the constraint in (24) can be solved for the optimal (w,e).  Note, that this is the 
efficient outcome.  Define p(v0) to be the maximised value of profits from (24).  From the normality 
assumption in (23) the level of e must be decreasing in v0.  Now consider what happens when a 
restriction e£?e* is imposed.  Denote by p(v0,e*) to be the level of profits when the firm is constrained in 
                                                                 
5   Note that we are concerned with a positive issue here (the direction of the impact of the restrictions on worker 
utility) rather than the normative issues of efficiency which have been the subject of most of the rest of the 
paper. This is partly because, when e is a normal bad, one can no longer separate efficiency and distribution as 
can be done in the models in the rest of the paper. 
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this way and must give workers utility v0.  If the constraint is binding, the partial equilibrium effect will be 
that the workers are no better off while the firm is worse-off.  But, it is also likely that v0 changes.  For 
example, if we consider a free-entry equilibrium with a perfectly elastic supply of workers then, in 
equilibrium, we must have w=p(e) so that wages will fall.  And, because the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium is efficient, workers must lose out by the restriction.  If they hate e enough, they would be 
prepared to accept a lower wage to obtain it without any need for government intervention.  This is the 
standard argument used by economists against these types of intervention. 
Now, let us consider what is likely to happen in a monopsonistic labour market.  To consider 
this case, let us go back to the model described in section 1 above and modify it so that p depends on e 
and workers care about utility v(w,e).  To focus attention on whether workers can ever be made better 
off by these policies let us consider the market equilibrium with a fixed number of workers and firms. 
First, consider the free market situation without any restrictions on e. The worst employer will 
give its workers utility of b where this is the utility obtainable when unemployed.  One can then solve for 
the equilibrium as: 
 
N(0)
(u(F))  =  (b)
N(F)
p p  (26) 
The better firms in the labour market will not only offer a higher level of utility but also a lower level of 
effort. 
Now, consider what happens when we impose an upper bound on the level of e that is 
acceptable, e*.  Firms below some cut-off, point F* will now be constrained to offer e* while those 
above will be unconstrained.  The worst employer will cut wages so that their workers are no better off 
than before i.e. they still receive utility equal to b.  This mechanism is the usual one: the non-pecuniary 
aspects of the job are now more attractive so the pecuniary terms are worsened.  But, as we shall see 
this does not mean that other workers will not be better off.  Denote by u(F,e*) the level of utility 
received by workers in an employer at position F in the utility distribution when e* is the maximum legal 
level of e.  Equilibrium in the firms that are constrained by the law will be given by: 
 
N(0)
(u(F,e*),e*)  =  (b,e*)
N(F)
p p  (27) 
and equilibrium in the unconstrained firms will be given by: 
 
N(0)
(u(F,e*))  =  (b,e*)
N(F)
p p  (28) 
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The cut-off between the two regimes will be given by the value of F* which solves 
p(u(F*,e*))=p(u(F*,e*),e*) i.e. the point at which the law is just binding. 
The important point is that the profits of the worst employer, ( , *)b ep , fall.  In equilibrium, this 
means the profits of all other employers must also fall.  For the unconstrained firms, it is obvious from 
(28) that this means that worker utility must rise but the following Proposition shows that the normality 
condition (23) means that workers in all firms except the worst must be strictly better off. 
 
Proposition 7 
A reduction in e that binds in some firm and does not make positive profits impossible will always make 
all workers except those in the worst employer strictly better-off. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
This is a strong result as it shows that more restrictions on labour contracts that favour workers 
will always make them better off.  But the result does rely on the assumption of fixed numbers of firms 
and workers.  As profits fall, the number of firms will be reduced and this will tend to make the workers 
worse-off providing an offsetting effect.  But as worker utility rises this will also encourage the entry of 
workers.  But from our earlier analysis policies that reduce profits and increase worker utility do correct 
the failure in the free market. 
 One might want an analysis of the efficiency aspects of the intervention.  That is made difficult 
as, with e a ‘normal bad’, one cannot separate distribution and efficiency as is done in the rest of the 
paper.  Given the level of utility offered by an employer in a monopsonistic labour market, e will be at 
the efficient level.  But, the level of utility offered is inefficiently low which, given the normality condition, 
implies that effort is too high compared to the first-best.  This means that it is unclear whether the 
restrictions on labour contracts will increase or reduce efficiency. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper has used a simple model of a monopsonistic labour market to provide a unified treatment of 
a range of labour market policies.  The basic result is that average wages will tend to be too low in 
monopsony and there are a variety of policies tools that could be used to remedy the situation: minimum 
wages, trade unions, unemployment benefits (with a job search requirement), restrictions on employment 
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contracts.  If labour markets are monopsonistic there is no necessary trade-off between equity and 
efficiency for many of these policies though one should not take this to mean that the policies are 
universally good: typically there is an optimal level of intervention beyond which they will cause efficiency 
losses.  That labour markets are fundamentally monopsonistic has not been argued here (see Manning, 
2001, for this argument developed at length) but it is fundamentally plausible because there are sizable 
frictions in labour markets. 
 The theoretical arguments in this paper are no substitute for empirical research into the impact of 
the policies described here.  Indeed, empirical research is more important because one no longer has the 
certainty that particular policies are bad that comes from a strong belief in the underlying correctness of 
the perfectly competitive model.  But, hopefully, these theoretical arguments can give some support to 
those whose approach to policy is more pragmatic than ideological. 
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Figure 1 
The free entry equilibrium 
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 Figure 2 
 The free market and efficient equilibria 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The behaviour of workers  
The behaviour of workers in this labour market is very simple.  An employed worker will move to 
another job whenever a wage offer above the current wage is received.  An unemployed worker will 
accept a job whenever the wage offer received is above some reservation wage, r.  With the 
assumptions made the reservation wage will simply be equal to b, the value of leisure.  As job offers 
arrive at the same rate, whether employed or unemployed, the decision to accept a current job offer has 
no consequences for future job opportunities. 
 
Employment determination 
An employer who pays a wage w will recruit workers from among the unemployed (as long as it is 
larger than the reservation wage b) and from workers in other firms which pay less than w.  The 
employer will lose workers who exit to unemployment or leave the labour force or who quit to other 
firms which pay higher wages.  In general terms, if s(w;F) is the separation rate and R(w;F) is the 
recruitment rate, we must have in a steady state that: 
 s(w;F)N(w;F)  =  R(w;F)  (29) 
so that N(w;F) is the level of employment at which the flow of recruits equals the flow of separations.  In 
deriving N(w;F), a very useful result is that there is no mass point in any equilibrium wage distribution 
(see Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, for a proof).  The separation rate in a firm that pays w is:  
 s(w;F)  =   + [1-F(w)]d l  (30) 
as workers leave for non-employment at a rate d, receive other job offers at a rate ? and a fraction [1-
F(w)] of these offers are better than their current wage. 
Deriving the flow of recruits to the firm is slightly more complicated.  It is helpful to first derive 
the employment rate and the distribution of wages across workers. 
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The employment rate 
The employment rate, n, will simply be given by: 
 n  =  
 + 
l
d l
 (31) 
as workers leave employment for unemployment at a rate d and obtain jobs at a rate ?. 
 
The distribution of wages across workers  
We have denoted the distribution of wages across firms by F(w).  This is not the same as the distribution 
of wages across workers as the systematic search by workers for better-paying jobs means that they 
will concentrate in higher-wage firms.  Let us denote by G(w;F) the fraction of employed workers 
receiving a wage w or less when the wage offer distribution is F. 
In total there will be Gn of workers in this situation.  They will leave at a rate [d+?(1-F)] to be 
replaced at a rate ?F(1-n) of workers from unemployment.  Equating inflows and outflows we then 
have: 
 [ + (1-F)]Gn  =  F(1-n)d l l  (32) 
Using the fact that n=?/(d+?), re-arrangement of this leads to: 
 
F
G  =  
( + )F
d
d l
 (33) 
From inspection of (33) one can see that G(w;F)<F for 0<F<1 which implies that workers are 
concentrated in the better-paying jobs, implying that such firms must have a higher level of employment. 
This is easy to understand: higher-wage firms have lower separation rates and higher recruitment rates 
so that they have more workers. 
 
The flow of recruits to a firm 
Now let us go back to deriving the level of employment in a firm that pays w.  Recruits to this firm will 
come from unemployment and those employed in lower-wage jobs.  There are ?(1-n)Mw unemployed 
worker who receive job offers which are shared equally over the Mf firms so that  the flow of 
unemployed recruits to the firm will be ?(1-n)Mw/Mf=?(1-n)/M.  Similarly, there are ?nG(w;F)Mw 
workers currently earning less than w who get job offers which again are spread over the Mf firms.  So, 
the total flow of recruits to a firm that pays w is given by: 
21  
 [ ]R(w;F)  =  1-n + nG(w;F)      =  
M M[ + (1-F)]
l dl
d l
 (34) 
where the second equality follows from the use of (31) and (33).  Combining (29), (30), and (34) we 
finally have the following expression: 
 2N(w;F)  =  M[  + (1-F(w)) ]
dl
d l
 (35) 
for the supply of labour to the firm. Note that the position of the firm in the wage offer distribution is a 
sufficient statistic for the supply of labour to the firm.  
 
Expected profits 
Expected profits can be written as: 
 ( )( ) [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] ( )E E p w F N F p E w E Np = - = -  (36) 
where E(N) is the average level of employment in a firm.  This must be the employment rate as given by 
(31) divided by the ratio of firms to workers.  This gives (3). 
 
The value of being unemployed 
Denote by V(F) the value of being employed at position F in the wage distribution and by Vu the value 
of being unemployed.  These value functions must be given by: 
 ( ) 1( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]ur c u FV F w F V V F V f V F dfd d l= + - + -ò  (37) 
and: 
 
1 1
0 0
[ ( ) ] [ (0) ] [ ( ) (0)]u u urV b V f V df b V V V f V dfd l l l= + - = + - + -ò ò  (38) 
Differentiate (37) to yield: 
 c
w(F)
V(F)  =  
+ (1-F)d l
¢
¢  (39) 
Now integrate the term under the integral sign in (38) by parts to obtain: 
 
1
0
(1 ) ' ( )
(0)
(1 )
1 1
c
0 0
f w f df
V(f) V df  =  V (f).[1- f]df
f
l
l l
d l
-
¢- =é ùë û + -ò ò ò  (40) 
Now, taking differences of (37) and (38) we have that: 
 u c
w (0)-b
[V(0)- ]  =  V
+d l
 (41) 
22  
Using (38), (40) and (41) leads to the following expression for Vu: 
 
1
u c
r c
0
[1- f]w (f)df
  =  b + [w(0)-b] + V
+ (1- f)+
l l
d
d ld l
¢
ò  (42) 
Integrating the final term in (42) by parts we have: 
 2 ( )[ (1 )]
1
u
r c
0
  =  b  b + w f dfV
+ M f
l dl
d
d l d l
-
+ -ò  (43) 
Using (1) and (2) this can be written as (4) as the integral in (43) can be written as 
1
0
( ) ( )cN f w f dfò . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Defining a multiplier µ for the constraint MMw=Mf, the first-order conditions for the maximisation of (9) 
with respect to (Mw,Mf,M) can be written as:  
 ww
(M)[p-b]
 - ( ) - M  =  0C M
[ + (M)]
l
m
d l
 (44) 
 
 ff - ( ) +   =  0C M m  (45) 
 
 w2
(M)[p-b]
 -   =  0M
[ + (M)]
dl
m
d l
¢
 (46) 
Re-arranging these leads to (9) and (10). 
 Comparing these with the entry conditions (5) and (7) allows us to derive (11) as the efficient 
level of average wages. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 
As only the employed pay taxes and the unemployed receive welfare benefits, the break-even constraint 
for the scheme can be written as: 
 
r
  =  
+ +
lt d
d l d l
 (47) 
(47) implies the free entry condition for workers (20) implies can be written as: 
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) ( )
]
ww
(M [E w b]
  =  ( )C M
[ + (M)
l
d l
-
 (48) 
which is, given the level of expected wages, independent of the welfare system.  The only issue is 
whether a suitable choice of the welfare system can get the expected wage at the appropriate level.  This 
amounts to the condition that the lowest wage is set at the efficient level which requires that: 
 (0) ( )Mw b r p p bl
d
t e
d l
= + + = - -
+
 (49) 
Re-arrangement of (49) and use of (47) leads to (21). 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
 
From (14) and (22) we have that:  
 0( )
1
b
E w p p
td
d l t
-é ù= - -ê ú+ -ë û
 (50) 
An increase in progressivity raises both 0t  and t  which reduces the average wage.  This encourages 
the entry of firms.  As the tax system simply redistributes among workers in employment the expected 
wage for workers must also be given by (50) so that entry of workers is discouraged. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
 
As p(b,e*) must be increasing in e* if it binds, a reduction in e must reduce p(b,e*).  For F>F*, it is 
obvious that u(F) must then increase.  For F<F* we have that: 
 u e e
u(F,e*) N(0)
(u(F,e*),e*)  + (u(F,e*),e*)  =  (b,e*)
e* N(F)
p p p
¶
¶
 (51) 
Re-arranging this can be written as: 
 u e e
(u(F,e*),e*) u(F,e*) (b,e*) (u(F,e*),e*)
  =   - 
N(F) (u(F,e*),e*) e* (b,e*) (u(F,e*),e*)
p p p
p p p
¶
¶
 (52) 
so that the sign of ¶ u(F,e*)/¶ e* depends on the sign of ¶ 2log[p(u,e)]/ ue¶¶ .  We know that this is 
positive because of the inferiority of e so that u¶ (F,e*)/ e¶ *>0.  This proves the Proposition. 
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